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The impact of agglomeration economies
on hospital input prices
Andrew I. Friedson1* and Jing Li2
Abstract
This paper examines the extent to which agglomeration of the hospital service industry enhances the productivity
of producing health care. Specifically, we use a large set of private insurance claims from the FAIR Health database
to show that an increasing spatial concentration of hospital services results in a decreased cost of obtaining
intermediate medical services. We explicitly test whether the reduced cost at concentrated locations arises from the
ability to share intermediate service providers. The identification relies on state variation in medical lab technician
licensure requirements, which influence the cost of intermediate services only through the cost of running a lab.
Our findings suggest that agglomeration of the hospital service industry attracts specialized medical labs, which in
turn help to reduce the cost of producing laboratory tests.
Keywords: Agglomeration, Health care, Input sharing
JEL codes: R00, I11, L23
Background
Health care resources are highly concentrated in the
United States. As documented by the Dartmouth Atlas
of Health Care, a large fraction of hospital beds are
located in a small number of areas, including California,
the Chicago area, the Northeast coastal area, and
Florida.1 The tremendous concentration of health care
capacity in a small number of locations has received
much attention in recent years, especially with respect
to whether health outcomes have been sufficiently
improved in areas concentrated with a large amount of
medical resources.2 In contrast, less attention has been
paid to the potential cost savings that are likely generated
by agglomeration and related spillover effects arising from
spatial concentration of medical resources. This paper ex-
plores the extent to which local agglomeration of medical
services fosters spillover effects that enhance the efficiency
with which medical services are provided and which
further leads to a reduced cost of producing health care.
Understanding the impact of hospital concentrations on
cost savings is valuable for both U.S. health policy and
hospital administration going forward as U.S. hospitals
face increasing pressure to operate more efficiently.
It has long been recognized in the urban economics
literature that productivity is often enhanced when firms
operate in concentrated locations.3 Firms which locate
near each other benefit from external economies of scale
also known as agglomeration economies.4 These benefits
arise from various channels. For instance, firm clusters
facilitate the spread of knowledge due to increased
opportunities for learning from nearby workers and
firms (i.e. knowledge spillovers); clusters of firms also
gain the advantage of drawing upon skilled pools of
nearby labor (i.e. labor market pooling) as well as the
ability to share valuable intermediate input providers
(i.e., input sharing).
There is a large empirical literature on the nature and
magnitude of external economies of scale, especially on
the subject of how they arise through the channels of
knowledge spillovers and labor market pooling.5 For the
health care industry in particular, Bates and Santerre [1]
showed that a 10 % increase in the number of hospitals
per capita is associated with a 4.6 percent increase in
hospital productivity. These benefits to hospitals from
spatial concentration have been shown empirically to
come from labor market pooling, which provides better
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job matches, and from knowledge spillovers, which
increase the efficiency of care [2].
There is a comparatively smaller empirical literature
studying agglomeration benefits through the sharing
of intermediate input providers, which this study will con-
tribute to. Holmes [3] demonstrated that industries with a
greater degree of localization also tend to have a greater
degree of vertical disintegration. This result was further
reinforced for the health care sector by Li [4], who
showed that hospitals in agglomerated areas are more
likely to outsource intermediate services such as
laboratory tests. Both studies documented the linkage
between agglomeration economies and outsourcing
behavior. One key result still missing from this litera-
ture is an estimate of the magnitude of cost savings
or productivity gains that hospitals (or firms in
general) reap from sharing intermediate input pro-
viders in concentrated locations.
This study extends the literature by examining how
agglomeration of the hospital service industry enhances
the productivity of producing health care through the
channel of input sharing. Specifically, we examine the
magnitude to which increasing spatial concentration of
hospital services results in a decreased cost of obtaining
intermediate medical services, in this case laboratory
tests.6 We explicitly test whether the reduced cost of lab
tests at concentrated locations arises from the ability
to share intermediate service providers by drawing on
state variation in medical lab technician licensure
requirements that exogenously impact the cost of
running a lab. Because state licensure requirements
likely affect the cost of intermediate medical services
only through the cost of running a lab, we are able
to use this variation in licensure requirements as an
instrument to identify whether agglomeration of the
hospital service industry attracts specialized medical
labs, which in turn help to reduce the cost of produ-
cing laboratory tests.
Our findings contribute to both the health economics
literature and the urban economics/agglomeration litera-
ture. They contribute to the health economics literature
by emphasizing a relatively new perspective in health
economics – external economies of scale, and specific-
ally input sharing – for improving the productivity of
health care services. This is especially important for the
hospital industry as controlling costs has become a
critical issue not just for individual hospitals, but for the
society in general. Our findings also contribute to the
agglomeration literature by providing evidence that
intermediate input sharing is a significant contributor to
agglomeration benefits. This is the first estimation of the
exact magnitude of cost savings associated with input
sharing, which has to this point been a missing piece of
the literature.
To achieve the aforementioned goals, we first
present a model of hospital outsourcing behavior for
intermediate medical services. The model has two
main predictions that we later empirically test. First,
when the concentration of hospital services increases,
the size of the intermediate input industry (i.e., inde-
pendent medical labs) should also increase. Second,
when the concentration of hospitals increases, the
price of intermediate services should then decrease.7
Because both the price of the intermediate service
and the size of the intermediate industry are simul-
taneously determined and as higher prices may
reversely lead to more employment in local medical
labs, we need an instrument to identify what portion
of the price decrease is due to the increase in the size
of the input industry. The model suggests that an
ideal instrument is the cost of entry for intermediate
input providers, in the sense that it affects the price
of intermediate medical services only through its
deterrence of the entry of independent medical labs.
In practice, it is extremely difficult to find a measure
of entry costs for independent labs that is not also a
measure of costs for in-house labs. As an alternative
instrument, we use variation in state licensure
requirements for medical laboratory technicians. State
licensure requirements make hiring technicians more
expensive, and only impact the price of intermediate
services through the cost of running a lab. In this
sense, differences in licensing requirements provides
an exogenous shock, which could not be the result of
reverse causality, to the cost of providing intermediate
medical services.
We empirically test the model using data compiled from
several data sources. Data on the price of laboratory tests
come from the restricted FAIR Health Medical/Surgical
database. The FAIR Health data are merged with hospital
concentration information from the Centers for Medicaid
and Medicare Services Provider of Services files, and with
population counts and demographics information from
the U.S. Census and the Area Resource File. The final data
source is the Dun and Bradstreet database from
which we acquire information on independent labora-
tory employment. Empirical findings show that the
lab technician licensing requirements reduce the size
of medical labs, which further lead to an increasing
in the cost of performing various tests. The evidence
is consistent with our model predictions.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section
'Model' discusses the model that generates two hypoth-
eses to be tested in the empirical section. Section 'Data'
describes the data and state specific lab technician licens-
ing laws. Section 'Methods' discusses the identification
strategy and empirical specifications. Results are presented
in Section 'Results'. Section 'Discussion' concludes.
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Model
Agglomeration of the hospital service industry reduces
the price of intermediate medical services through two
channels. The first is that concentration of the medical
industry promotes the entry of intermediate medical
service suppliers into the local area and the increased
number of intermediate suppliers then results in lower
prices for intermediate goods due to increased competi-
tion. This is pecuniary agglomeration economies as in
Brueckner [5] and it does not involve the increasing
returns to scale that necessitates Marshall’s notion of
input sharing. We will refer to this channel as cost
reduction through competition.
The second channel though which hospital concentra-
tion leads to reduced input costs is the traditional
Marshallian input sharing mechanism. In the Marshallian
framework, input production of medical services involves
scale economies. Concentrations of downstream hos-
pitals form a large potential outsourcing demand for
intermediate inputs, which allows specialized input
providers to achieve an efficient scale of production
and thereby provide the input services at a lower
cost. We will refer to this channel as cost reduction
through specialization.
Both mechanisms generate similar predictions: a higher
concentration of medical services increases the scale of
the intermediate medical industry and the increased scale
of the intermediate industry then results in reduced cost
of producing medical inputs. Also predicted by both
models is that the cost of entry does not affect the price of
lab tests directly and serves as an ideal instrument for the
size of the local medical laboratory.8
Cost reduction through competition
To illustrate the first cost reduction channel though
competition, we adopt the model proposed by Ono [6],
which assumes that final producers purchase all inter-
mediate services locally. This is likely to be true for the
health care industry when hospitals send physical
samples to be tested by nearby specialized medical labs.9
For simplicity, the model assumes that only one inter-
mediate input is needed for production.
The model is completed by solving for the equilibrium
market price of the intermediate service and the equilib-
rium number of service producers. To achieve this goal,
we first analyze how intermediate service producers set
the price and the quantity of the service provided by
maximizing their profits. This depends on both the mar-
ket demand for intermediate medical services and the
cost function associated with providing these services.
The full derivation of the model can be found in the
Additional file 1.
The key implication of the model is that decision on
whether to enter the market or not is based on
anticipated profit and the cost of entry. We assume that
a service supplier will enter the market if its anticipated
profit is at least the same size as the cost of entry. The
model then gives us,
P−ϖð Þ Q
M
¼ C; ð1Þ
where P is the market price of the service, C represents
the cost of entry, ϖ is the cost of production of the
intermediate service, Q is the outsourcing demand and
M is the number of input producers. This suggests that
the equilibrium number of service suppliers, M*, will be
a function of two exogenous factors that enter the
system, M* (C,N). This conclusion also implies that the
cost of entry for intermediate service suppliers, C, has a
direct impact on the equilibrium number of service
suppliers (M*) but not on the equilibrium quantity or
the price of the inputs provided (P*, Q*). Its impact on
the price of intermediate services is solely through its
effect on M since P* = p [M* (C,N),N]. This leads to an
ideal instrument (i.e., cost of entry) for the size of the
intermediate industry when attempting to identify the
extent to which the entry of medical labs results in a
reduced price of intermediate medical services.
Cost reduction through specialization
The model for cost reduction through specialization
departs from the model for the competition mechanism
by assuming that there is only one intermediate service
supplier. The supplier decides whether or not to enter
the market and if so decides on its optimal level of
production. This firm gains from returns to scale, which
provides benefits to production as the intermediate
supplier grows. The full derivation of this model can be
found in the Additional file 1. The result of the model is
once again that the cost of entry impacts the size of the
intermediate industry, and that the price of the inter-
mediate service is a function of the industry size. This
result, which is the same for both the competition
case and the specialization case, is summarized in
Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: The cost of entry for intermediate
medical service suppliers has a direct impact on the
number of service suppliers (competition case) or the
amount of lab employment (specialization case) in the
local market. It affects the equilibrium price of
intermediate services only through its impact on the
size of the local intermediate input industry.
Comparative statics
Of interest is how a change in concentration of the
hospital service industry affects the likelihood that
independent medical labs choose to locate in the same
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area or how big the local medical lab industry is likely to
be; as well as how increased intermediate input services
in locations with concentrated services lead to lower
intermediate input prices. To this end, both models are
solved for comparative statics, which are summarized in
Proposition 2. Both models suggest that the size of the
intermediate industry increases with the degree of the
hospital concentration. Further, the presence of a sizable
intermediate medical industry reduces the cost associ-
ated with obtaining medical laboratory tests. This
hypothesis will be empirically tested in the following
context.
Proposition 2: ∂M

∂N > 0 and
∂P
∂N < 0 if the marginal
revenue facing supplier j is steeper than the demand
function (competition case) or the marginal revenue
facing the single input supplier is steeper than the
marginal cost function which is downward sloping
(specialization case).
(Proof of Proposition 2 is provided in the Additional file 1)
Data
The data for our analysis come from several different
sources. Price data come from the Medical/Surgical
Module of the FAIR Health database between 2003
and 2010.10 The FAIR Health data is a collection of
claims submitted from providers to private insurance
companies. Though submission to the FAIR Health
data is voluntary, there is evidence that the data are na-
tionally representative [7]. Within a claim, individual pro-
cedures and their specific prices can be identified by
line item using the American Medical Association’s
Current Procedure Terminology (CPT) codes. For a
given line item, we observe the date for which the
procedure was billed, the three-digit zip code, and the
amount that the insurance company reimbursed the
service provider, known as the allowed amount, and
any modifier codes.11
The reimbursement amount is not a direct measure of
the cost of the intermediate service. It is a function of
the bargaining process between insurance companies
and hospitals. There is however reason to believe that
despite the noise introduced by the bargaining process,
the reimbursement amount is still highly correlated with
the true cost of a procedure. Clemens and Gottlieb [8]
demonstrate that private payments are heavily influenced
by prices set by Medicare, which are in turn a direct func-
tion of Medicare’s cost estimates for procedures.
Since there are as many as several hundred intermediate
medical procedures in the data as identified by their
unique CPT codes, we will select a small subset of the
procedures for the purpose of this study. Selection of the
interested intermediate medical procedures is based on
the frequency that a service has been identified as
outsourced using modifier code 90. Specifically, we focus
on laboratory tests with the top ten most frequent occur-
rences of modifier code 90.12 This provides us with an
objective way of selecting the procedures to study. Table 1
lists the 10 laboratory tests with the most frequent inci-
dence of modifier code 90 in the data. Descriptions of
each procedure can be found in the Additional file 1.13
The price associated with each intermediate medical
procedure is aggregated at the three-digit zip code
level – the smallest geographic identifier available in
the FAIR Health data. The summary statistics for the
average price of each procedure focused on in this
study are reported in Table 2.
To help explain the price variation in intermediate
medical services across different locations, we obtain
data on the size of the local hospital industry, the
amount of medical lab employment, the size of the local
area, local population counts, as well as other geographic
and demographic attributes from a variety of data
sources. The number of hospital beds, which serves as a
measure for the agglomeration extent of the local
medical industry (especially once population density is
controlled for), is obtained from the 2009 Provider of
Services (POS) File. The POS file is collected by the
Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services and con-
tains information, such as the number of hospitals
and the available hospital beds, at the five-digit zip
code level.14
Medical lab employment data are from the Dun
and Bradstreet (D&B) Marketplace data files for the
third quarter of 2007. These data are collected by
Dunn and Bradstreet, a for-profit firm, and contain a
wealth of information on businesses. This includes
detailed information on the industry to which each
business establishment in the data belongs, the number of
workers onsite, as well as the five-digit zip code where the
business is located. The industry information is identified
Table 1 Laboratory tests with the most frequent modifier code
90 occurrences
Rank CPT code Description
1 80048 Basic Metabolic Panel
2 80050 General Health Panel
3 80051 Electrolyte Panel
4 80061 Lipid Panel
5 80076 Hepatic Function Panel
6 81001 Urinalysis with Microscopy
7 81003 Urinalysis without Microscopy
8 82043 Urine Test for Renal Disease or Diabetes
9 82105 Test for Alpha-Fetoprotein Levels
10 82150 Another Hepatic Function Panel
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by six-digit North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS) codes. We use information on businesses
with NAICS code 621511, which identifies independent
medical laboratories.
Data on social economic attributes are obtained from
the 2010 Area Resource File (ARF), which is published by
the Health Resources and Services Administration. This
file provides a set of social economic attributes at the
county level, of which we include the following as further
controls: the percentage of the population without health
insurance, the percentage of the population greater than
65 years old, per capita income, the percentage of the
population which is Non-White, and the percentage of the
population with lower than a high school education. The
final data source is the U.S. census from which we obtain
information on area size and population density.
The various data sources were merged together via
three-digit zip codes. Most data sources used (The Fair
Health data, the D&B data file, and the US Census) pro-
vide information at the five-digit zip code level, making
data merges relatively simple. The ARF data is provided
at the county level. In this case data were matched by an
area weighted average of the variable of interest based
on how much land area the two geographic units in
question (the county area and the three-digit zip code
area) have in common. Summary statistics for these
variables are presented in Table 2.
The information on medical lab technician licensing
requirements comes from the American Society for
Clinical Pathology (ASCP). The ASCP promotes
personnel standards that include certification, licensure,
and practice requirements. Eleven states out of fifty license
laboratory personnel as of November 2009: California,
Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, New York,
North Dakota, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and West
Virginia. Of these states, New York, North Dakota, and
California enacted their licensing requirements during the
time frame of our sample (New York in 2006, North
Dakota in 2006, and California in 2007), although for the
purposes of identification we will be using the geographic
differences in the laws rather than the temporal differ-
ences as our measure of lab employment is only observed
in one year. For the purpose of this study, we code the
licensing requirements equal to one if a state has a licens-
ing law active for its in-state medical laboratory personnel
in a specific year.
Data were matched into the FAIR Health data by
year when possible. This was done for all data other
than the Dunn and Bradstreet data or the number of
hospital beds, as they were only available for a single
year. These data were matched such that the single
year of data populated the same field for all years in
the FAIR Health data.
It is important to note that because we are match-
ing data from different years into a single analysis file,
and as we are using a single year of hospital bed
data, we are implicitly assuming that the density of
hospital beds is relatively stable over time. If the
number of beds changes rapidly then it would be
invalid to estimate prices in 2006 or 2007 based on
the number of beds in a geographic area in 2009.
Fortunately, this is not the case. The Dartmouth Atlas
tracks the number of acute care hospital beds, and
reports the number of beds per resident in 2006 and
2012. Over this time frame in the 200 most populated
hospital referral regions the average change in the
number of beds per 1,000 residents was -0.36 beds.
Only 5 out of 200 of the regions had a change with a
magnitude greater than or equal to 1 bed per 1,000
residents, with the largest change being -1.1 beds per
1,000 residents. Overall this is a very slow rate of
change, lending validity to the choice of using one year of
hospital bed data to represent hospital agglomeration for
several years of data.
Methods
All analysis conducted in this study used STATA statistical
software. The first question that we explore is whether
Table 2 Summary statistics
Mean Std. dev.
Price of
Basic Metabolic Panel (CPT 80048) 10.43 7.13
General Health Panel (CPT 80050) 33.50 22.03
Electrolyte Panel (CPT 80051) 8.41 7.79
Lipid Panel (CPT 80061) 16.88 10.47
Hepatic Function Panel (CPT 80076) 11.12 7.71
Urinalysis with Microscopy (CPT 81001) 5.19 8.33
Urinalysis without Microscopy (CPT 81003) 3.62 3.02
Urine Test for Renal Disease or Diabetes (CPT
82043)
10.29 8.08
Test for Alpha-Fetoprotein Levels (CPT 82105) 19.93 16.51
Another Hepatic Function Panel (CPT 82150) 8.13 6.24
Total Number of Hospital Beds (100 s) 11.32 12.96
Medical Lab Employment (100 s) 3.49 65.56
Population Density (1,000 s per Square Mile) 0.70 3.40
Area (1,000 s of Square Miles) 3.79 4.41
Average Size of Local Hospitals (100 s of Beds) 1.51 0.92
Lab Technician Licensure Requirements 0.2222 0.4157
Percentage of Uninsured Population 0.1976 0.0570
Per Capita Income (USD) 34757.31 10742.11
Percentage of Lower than High School Education 0.0784 0.0424
Percentage of Non-White 0.1625 0.1306
Percentage of Greater than 65 Years Old 0.1403 0.0297
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agglomeration economies facilitate cost savings for labora-
tory tests. To this end, we begin by estimating a model
with the following specification via ordinary least squares
(OLS),
Pit ¼ β0 þ β1Bedsi þ β2PopDeni þ β3Areai þ β4AveSizei
þβ5Xi þ Trendt þ Regioni þ Trendt  Regioni
þεit
ð2Þ
where, Pit is the average price for a medical laboratory
test in three digit zip code area i in year t; Bedsi is the
number of hospital beds in area i (does not very over
time); PopDeni represents population density in area i;
and Areai is the area of the three digit zipcode i in
square miles. Controlling for these two variables is
important for three reasons. First, holding population
constant is important for measuring how concentrated
the hospital industry is – there is a large difference be-
tween 500 beds for a population of 5,000 and 500 beds
for a population of 50,000. Second, demand for health
services is largely dependent on population. Many health
services are consumed only when an adverse health
event occurs. These events occur with some probability
for each individual, making health services subject to a
demand function that is due in large part to the size
of the local population. Third, prices vary with the
degree to which an area is developed. The same pro-
cedure may be charged for a higher price in more
densely populated areas. All these considerations
make controlling for population density important
when estimating the price of health services. Once
population density is controlled for, β1 gives an
estimate of the effect of hospital services density on
the price of the intermediate input.
Another factor that is important in influencing the
price of intermediate medial services is the size compos-
ition of local hospitals. On the one hand, large hospitals
may be more proficient in exploring internal economies
of scale, which are likely to reduce the cost of producing
intermediate medical services in-house. On the other
hand, small hospitals may be more beneficial in creating
a community of independent suppliers [9] which tends
to enhance the input sharing mechanism and reduce the
price of intermediate services.15 Which one of the two
effects dominates is unclear. We include AveSizei, the
average size of the local hospitals, which is assumed not
to vary over time, to capture such an effect. Xi is a vector
of controls which includes the percent of the local popu-
lation that are uninsured, the percent that are un-
employed, the percent with less than a high school
education, the percent that are non-white, the percent
that are over 65 years of age, and the median household
income. Trendt is a vector of year trends to capture
nationwide price inflation. This variable is further inter-
acted with a region dummy to capture any region-
specific year trends in inflation. These variables also
capture any region level unobservable omitted variables
that either do not vary with time or that vary over time
in a linear fashion.
Next we explore whether the impact of agglomeration
economies on input prices arises from the ability to
share intermediate input providers. First we examine
whether an increase in hospital density is associated with
an increase in the size of independent laboratory
employment. We do so by estimating the following
specification via OLS, in which we change the dependent
variable in Eq. (2) to the size of the local intermediate
medical industry as measured by independent medical
laboratory employment in 2007,
LabEi ¼ β0 þ β1Bedsi þ β2PopDeni þ β3Areai
þβ4AveSizei þ β5Xi þ Regioni þ εi
ð3Þ
Then, to get a better sense of how the reduced price
of medical laboratory tests is due to the increase in the
medical lab employment, we re-estimate Eq. (2) after
including LabEi as an additional explanatory variable,
Pit ¼ β0 þ β1Bedsi þ β2LabEi þ β3PopDeni þ β4Areai
þ β5AveSizei þ β6Xi þ Trendt þ Regioni
þ Trendt  Regioni þ εit
ð4Þ
This specification provides a general association be-
tween lab employment and the price of laboratory tests.
However, as medical lab employment is simultaneously
determined with the price of the intermediate medical
services and higher prices may attract more medical labs
to the local area, the estimated β2 in this case will be
biased due to endogeneity arising from reverse causality.
To deal with this issue we re-estimate Eq. (4) with two
stage least squares (2SLS), using variation in state lab
technician licensure laws as an instrument for medical
laboratory employment. Specifically, state licensure laws
create spatial variation in the cost of hiring lab workers,
which in turn creates clean variation in how agglomer-
ation can translate into growth in the intermediate
industry. Though licensure laws do not fit the criteria of
an ideal instrument as proposed by the theoretical
model, they do pass the exclusion restriction needed for
identification in a reduced form setting. Identification is
based on state licensure laws only impacting the cost of
intermediate services through the cost of running a
medical lab. The laws have no direct effect on the price
of intermediate tests, are not likely reversely determined
by the price of tests, and do not impact their price
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through any channel other than the cost of intermediate
input production. The 2SLS estimation provides a
refined window into the mechanism of agglomeration
economies. In the first stage we are able to see how
hospital density impacts the size of the intermediate
input industry. Then in the second stage we can observe
how the size of the intermediate industry affects the
price of the intermediate input directly.
Results
Agglomeration’s impact on input prices
Tables 3 and 4 report results for two of the laboratory
tests focused on in this study: Table 3 contains results
for a basic metabolic panel (CPT 80048), and Table 4
reports results for a urinalysis with microscopy (CPT
81001). Results from the OLS estimations are reported
in columns (1) through column (3) of both tables. The
first column reports estimates for Eq. (2), the second
column reports estimates for a regression using lab
employment as the dependent variable (Eq. (3), and the
third column reports the OLS estimates for Eq. (4). The
2SLS estimates are reported in column (4) and column
(5) of both tables.
The estimates in column (1) of both tables suggest
that an increase in the scale of the hospital service
industry decreases the price of medical laboratory tests.
This is obtained without controlling for the local medical
lab employment. The magnitude of the impact is 0.048
dollars for Basic Metabolic Panel and 0.017 dollars for
Urinalysis with Microscopy, for an increase of 100 hospital
beds in a three-digit zip code area. The regression also
produces a positive coefficient for population density, a
positive coefficient for the physical size of the area, and a
negative coefficient for the average size of the local hospi-
tals all of which are significant at conventional levels.
These estimates have intuitive interpretations. First, higher
demand as captured by larger population density increases
the price of intermediate medical services. Second, larger
physical area is generally associated with higher input
prices. This might be because the larger an area is
Table 3 Basic Metabolic Panel (80048, Blood Test) (t stats are reported in parentheses using robust standard errors)
Model OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
1st stage 2nd stage
Dependent variable Average price Lab employment Average price Lab employment Average price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Independent variables
Total Number of Hospital Beds (100 s) −0.048*** 32.085*** −0.028*** 32.162*** 0.681***
(-7.15) (25.77) (-3.82) (25.69) (2.86)
Medical Lab Employment (100 s) - - −0.0632*** - −2.273***
- - (-5.44) - (-3.05)
Population Density (1,000 s per Square Mile) 0.229*** 7.622* 0.234*** 7.859* 0.403***
(4.89) (1.69) (5.02) (1.75) (3.40)
Area (1,000 s of Square Miles) 0.257*** −18.468*** 0.245*** −18.063*** −0.165
(8.00) (-13.09) (7.61) (-12.49) (-1.13)
Average Hospital Size (100 s of Beds) −0.419*** −63.206*** −0.459*** −60.800*** −1.864***
(-3.65) (-6.20) (-3.98) (-5.81) (-3.19)
Lab Technician Licensing Laws - - - −60.772*** -
- - - (-3.39) -
Demographic Controlsa YES YES YES YES YES
Year Trend YES NO YES YES YES
Region Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES
Year Trend × Region Fixed Effect YES NO YES YES YES
No. of observations 6334 6344 6334 6334 6334
R-squared 0.209 0.515 0.210 0.515 -
Root MSE 6.379 456.31 6.373 456.31 11.88
First-stage F-statistics - - - 11.508
Wooldridge Robust Score Test - - - 33.874
aOther control variables include county-level measure of % of uninsured, % of > 65 years old, per capita income, % Non-white, and % of < high school. Statistical
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels are denoted with ***, **, and * respectively
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physically, the higher the average transportation cost is.
This likely increases the cost of outsourcing, which in-
creases the price of the lab tests. Third, average hospital
size in the area reflects, from one perspective, the extent
to which large hospitals are capable of exploiting internal
economies of scale and, from another perspective, how
groups of small hospitals attract intermediate suppliers.
The former suggests that a higher average size of local
hospitals will reduce the cost of producing lab tests, while
the latter tends to predict a positive sign. The negative
coefficient associated with this variable suggests that it is
the internal economies of scale mechanism that domi-
nates this effect.
Column (2) of both Tables 3 and 4 explores the
relationship between hospital concentration and the
size of the intermediate industry. The estimated coef-
ficient associated with the number of hospital beds is
positive and statistically significant at conventional
levels for both tables. This implies that independent
medical labs tend to locate where the nearby hospital
industry is of larger scale. The magnitude is estimated
to be as large as a 32 lab employee increase per
additional 100 hospital beds. Additionally, higher
population density is also associated with more lab
employment and larger physical area is associated
with less medical lab employment. An increased aver-
age hospital size is associated with lower independent
lab employment, as larger hospitals are more likely to
be able to support an in-house lab.
Column (3) reports estimates from the same regres-
sion as column (1) with laboratory employment as an
additional regressor. Larger medical lab employment is
associated with a reduced price for both of the tests
examined. As the same time, the estimate for the effect
of additional hospital beds is smaller when the additional
regressor is included. This suggests that part of the
agglomeration effect measured by the number of beds is
absorbed by the inclusion of medical lab employment.
This is only a rough story; in order to precisely split out
the agglomeration effect into its parts we need to rely on
Table 4 Urinalysis with Microscopy (81001, Urine Test) (t stats are reported in parentheses using robust standard errors)
Model OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
1st stage 2nd stage
Dependent variable Average price Lab employment Average price Lab employment Average price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Independent variables
Total Number of Hospital Beds (100 s) −0.017*** 32.114*** −0.009 32.204*** 0.122
(-3.07) (25.74) (-1.38) (25.66) (1.64)
Medical Lab Employment (100 s) - - −0.024*** - −0.432*
- - (-3.37) - (1.88)
Population Density (1,000 s per Square Mile) 0.045 7.659* 0.047 7.942* 0.078*
(1.38) (1.70) (1.44) (1.77) (1.88)
Area (1,000 s of Square Miles) 0.075*** −18.726*** 0.071** 18.258*** −0.006
(2.57) (-13.18) (2.46) (-12.52) (-0.12)
Average Hospital Size (100 s of Beds) −0.294** −63.089*** −0.309** −6.050*** −0.568***
(-2.03) (-6.18) (-2.16) (-5.79) (-2.68)
Lab Technician Licensing Laws - - - −63.36*** -
- - - (-3.53) -
Demographic Controlsa YES YES YES YES YES
Year Trend YES NO YES YES YES
Region Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES
Year Trend × Region Fixed Effect YES NO YES YES YES
No. of Observations 6309 6326 6309 6309 6309
R-squared 0.038 0.518 0.039 0.514 -
Root MSE 8.212 457.170 8.212 457.231 8.379
First-stage F-statistics - - - 12.524
Wooldridge Robust Score Test - - - 4.095
aOther control variables include county-level measure of % of uninsured, % of > 65 years old, per capita income, % Non-white, and % of < high school. Statistical
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels are denoted with ***, **, and * respectively
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the instrument in our next analysis. The estimates asso-
ciated with other control variables are generally consist-
ent with our previous findings.
The first stage of the 2SLS regression is reported in
column (4) of Tables 3 and 4. Similar to what is
shown in column (2) of both tables, an increase in
the number of hospital beds is positively associated
with a larger size for the intermediate laboratory in-
dustry. This provides evidence that increasing the
density of the hospital industry in a three-digit zip
code area increases the size of intermediate input
suppliers. At the same time licensing laws are associ-
ated with statistically significant decreases in inter-
mediate lab employment. Specifically, the adoption of
state licensing laws reduces independent lab employ-
ment by approximately 61 employees. F-statistics in
the first stage are above 10 in both cases.
The second-stage 2SLS estimates are reported in
column (5) of Tables 3 and 4. Once laboratory em-
ployment is instrumented for, there is a much stron-
ger negative effect of outside laboratory employment
on lab test prices. For instance, an increase in lab
employment of 100 employees is associated with a
$2.27 decrease in the cost of the Basic Metabolic
Panel. Columns (4) and (5) together provide evidence
that increased hospital density increases the size of
the intermediate industry (which is observed in the
first stage), which in turn lowers the cost of inter-
mediate inputs (which is observed in the second
stage), generating an agglomeration benefit. The mag-
nitude of the impact is larger than the OLS estimates
(-2.273 from the 2SLS regression compared to -0.063
from the OLS regression). This underlines the importance
of the previously mentioned concern of bias caused by
potential reverse causality. It is also important to note that
the direct effect of hospital density on the price of the
intermediate laboratory test is now positive and in some
cases not statistically significant at conventional levels.
This seems to suggest that the majority of the impact of
agglomeration economies on input prices is through input
sharing. Once the proxy for input sharing is controlled for,
the agglomeration measure itself no longer has significant
effect of reducing the input prices.
Tables 5 and 6 report estimates from the second
stage of the 2SLS estimation for the remaining eight
laboratory tests.16 All of the other tests show results
similar to those for the basic metabolic panel and
urinalysis with microscopy. Magnitudes range from
approximately a 0.52 dollar decrease in the price of a
urinalysis without microscopy per 100 additional lab
Table 5 The impact of agglomeration economies on various hospital input prices (t stats are reported in parentheses using robust
standard errors)
Type of intermediate medical service
(CPT code)
General health panel
(80050)
Electrolyte panel
(80051)
Lipid panel
(80061)
Hepatic function panel
(80076)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Number of Hospital Beds (100 s) 3.179*** 0.541*** 0.804*** 0.567***
(3.22) (2.75) (2.86) (2.75)
Medical Lab Employment (100 s) −1.078*** −1.830*** −2.663*** −1.900***
(-3.26) (-2.97) (-3.02) (-2.95)
Population Density (1,000 s per Square Mile) 0.621 0.275** 0.434*** 0.290***
(1.21) (2.43) (3.14) (2.70)
Area (1,000 s of Square Miles) −1.173* −0.139 −0.191 −0.075
(-1.93) (-1.12) (-1.11) (-0.57)
Average Hospital Size (100 s of Beds) −6.315*** −1.273** −2.104*** −1.446***
(-2.58) (-2.44) (-3.06) (-2.87)
Demographic Controlsa YES YES YES YES
Year Trend YES YES YES YES
Region FE YES YES YES YES
Year Trend × Region FE YES YES YES YES
No. of Observations 6297 5873 6373 6304
Root MSE 49.981 11.043 15.063 10.801
First-stage F-statistics 12.474 13.471 12.270 11.973
Wooldridge Robust Score Test 65.901 20.759 25.741 22.299
aOther control variables include county-level measure of % of uninsured, % of > 65 years old, per capita income, % Non-white, and % of < high school. Statistical
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels are denoted with ***, **, and * respectively
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employees, to approximately a 2.66 dollar decrease in
the price of a lipid panel per 100 additional lab
employees.
Competition or specialization? Some suggestive evidence
One remaining question about our results is whether the
cost reductions observed occur because of cost reduc-
tion through competition or because of cost reduction
through specialization. We provide some suggestive
evidence by estimating an equation qualitatively similar
to Eqn (3). We first replace the dependent variable of
the amount of laboratory employment with the number
of labs total, which we obtained from the U.S. Census,
and then we stratify by the amount of employment in
the labs. If increasing hospital density increases the
number of smaller labs, then that could be seen as
evidence in favor of cost reduction through competition.
On the other hand, if increasing hospital density
increases the number of large labs, then that would be
less indicative of cost reduction through competition.
Results of this analysis are presented in Table 7. The
only statistically significant effect of hospital density on
the number of labs occurs for medical labs with a total
employment of 500 or more employees, an effect of an
additional 2.74 labs per 100,000 hospital beds. This
result is suggestive that scale economies within a lab, or
specialization, is a major driving force in cost reductions
for intermediate inputs. However, this does not com-
pletely rule out cost reduction though competition. Even
though the additional labs that opened due to hospital
density were quite large, they were still additional labs,
and as such did push the market for intermediate
services towards competitiveness.
Laboratory employment or laboratory wages? Further
suggestive evidence
One question about our results is whether our measure
of laboratory employment is truly capturing the size of
the intermediate industry. It is possible that laboratory
employment is simply serving as a proxy for the inter-
mediate industry labor market equilibrium in general,
and that what we are measuring is an amalgam of both
employment and wage effects. To address this possibility
we run our analysis using a measure of the wages of la-
boratory workers obtained from the American Community
Survey. The average weekly wage is $1169.25 with a stand-
ard deviation of $646.41.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 8 for
a basic metabolic panel and in Table 9 for a urinalysis
Table 6 The impact of agglomeration economies on various hospital input prices (t stats are reported in parentheses using robust
standard errors)
Type of intermediate medical
service (CPT code)
Urinalysis without
microscopy (81003)
Urine test for early renal
disease or diabetes (82043)
Test for alpha-fetoprotein
levels (82105)
Another hepatic
function panel (82150)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Number of Hospital Beds (100 s) 0.155** 0.507*** 0.469 0.316**
(2.55) (2.63) (1.60) (2.22)
Medical Lab Employment (100 s) −0.524*** −1.667*** −1.633* −1.100***
(-2.75) (-2.76) (-1.78) (-2.47)
Population Density (1,000 s per Square Mile) 0.090*** 0.134 0.244 0.221***
(3.06) (1.41) (1.60) (3.22)
Area (1,000 s of Square Miles) −0.020 −0.052 0.271 −0.059
(-0.53) (-0.43) (-1.43) (-0.66)
Average Hospital Size (100 s of Beds) −0.403*** −1.291*** 0.980 −1.315***
(-2.62) (-2.70) (-1.40) (-3.72)
Demographic Controlsa YES YES YES YES
Year Trend YES YES YES YES
Region FE YES YES YES YES
Year Trend × Region FE YES YES YES YES
No. of Observations 6332 6159 5509 6146
Root MSE 3.640 11.032 7.315 7.406
First-stage F-statistics 13.017 12.345 13.452 11.190
Wooldridge Robust Score Test 14.920 15.643 3.603 11.183
aOther control variables include county-level measure of % of uninsured, % of > 65 years old, per capita income, % Non-white, and % of < high school. Statistical
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels are denoted with ***, **, and * respectively
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Table 8 Effect of wages for basic metabolic panel (80048, blood tests) (t stats are reported in parentheses using robust standard errors)
Model OLS OLS 2SLS
1st stage 2nd stage
Dependent variable Lab wages Average price Lab wages Average price
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Independent variables
Total Number of Hospital Beds (100 s) −0.007 0.0386*** −1.743 0.041***
(-0.57) (3.54) (-1.50) (3.56)
Medical Lab Wage - −0.000 - 0.004**
- (-.038) - (5.89)
Population Density (1,000 s per Square Mile) 0.202*** −0.003*** 0.208*** −0.004***
(4.32) (-8.46) (4.69) (-9.23)
Area (1,000 s of Square Miles) −7.741*** 0.310*** −10.112*** 0.338***
(-5.06) (8.78) (6.45) (9.29)
Lab Technician Licensing Laws - - 446.104*** -
- - (19.24) -
Demographic Controlsa YES YES YES YES
Year Trend YES YES YES YES
Region Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Year Trend × Region Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
No. of Observations 5122 5122 5122 5122
R-squared 0.194 0.194 0.245 -
Root MSE 581.95 6.586 563.719 6.864
First-stage F-statistics - - 69.03
Wooldridge Robust Score Test - - 33.099
aOther control variables include county-level measure of % of uninsured, % of > 65 years old, per capita income, % Non-white, and % of < high school. Statistical
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels are denoted with ***, **, and * respectively
Table 7 The impact of agglomeration economies on the number of medical labs of different sizes (t stats are reported in parentheses)
Medical labs of different sizes Medical Labs with
1-19 employment
Medical Labs with
20-99 employment
Medical Labs with
100-499 employment
Medical Labs with 500
or more employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Number of Hospital Beds (100,000 s) 0.413 0.304 −0.0718 2.740***
(1.29) (0.93) (-0.14) (4.41)
Population Density (100,000 s per Square Mile) 0.219 −0.013 0.858*** −1.181***
(1.36) (-0.08) (3.24) (-3.77)
Area (100,000 s of Square Miles) −0.212* 0.875*** 0.534*** −1.873***
(-1.96) (7.89) (-1.43) (-8.90)
Average Hospital Size (100 s of Beds) −0.010 −0.042*** −0.168*** 0.233***
(-1.46) (-5.88) (-14.69) (17.34)
Demographic Controlsa YES YES YES YES
No. of observations 4661 4661 4661 4661
R-Squared 0.004 0.047 0.151 0.233
aOther control variables include county-level measure of % of uninsured, % of > 65 years old, per capita income, % Non-white, and % of < high school. Statistical
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels are denoted with ***, **, and * respectively
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with microscopy (the results are presented in the same
format as Tables 3 and 4b which look at the same tests).
Unlike laboratory employment, the wage is not respon-
sive to the density of beds in a geographic area at stand-
ard levels of statistical significance.17 Further, there
appears to be little if any direct effect of the wage on the
price of laboratory tests. In the case of Blood Tests, we
do see that the price has been pushed up slightly due
to higher wage level (Table 8). In the case of Urine
Tests, the estimate is insignificant at conventional
levels (Table 9). Since the general impact, if it exists,
goes in the opposite direction of our main estimates,
Tables 8 and 9 show that the magnitude identified in
Tables 3 and 4 can be interpreted as a lower bound.
To the extent that still find a significant negative im-
pact of agglomeration on input prices, even though
higher wages may push up the price, it is sensible to
conclude that agglomeration economies have some
negative impact on hospital input prices. These
results suggest that to the extent our results are
driven by the labor market for laboratory technicians
it is mainly through the increase in employment and
with it the increase in the size of the intermediate
industry.
Discussion
It is a useful exercise to put the results of this study into
context in terms of magnitude. We find that increasing
hospital bed density by 100 beds in a geographic area is
associated with an additional 32 lab employees, or an
increase of approximately 9 percent off of the average.
An additional 100 employees is associated with lower
lipid panel prices of $2.66 or approximately a 16.8 per-
cent decrease off of the average. So, if we set all variables
to their population averages, an increase in beds of
approximately 10 percent (or about 110 beds) would be
associated with a downstream decrease in lipid panel
prices of $0.94 or a cost decrease of 5.6 percent off of
the average. This is roughly half the size of the effect
found by Cohen and Paul [2] for an increase of 1 % in
employment or proximity to expertise in other hospitals,
and a little over a third of the cost saving from hospital
consolidation found by Dranove and Lindrooth [10].
Table 9 Effect of wages for urinalysis with microscopy (81001, urine test) (t stats are reported in parentheses using robust standard errors)
Model OLS OLS 2SLS
1st stage 2nd stage
Dependent variable Lab wages Average price Lab wages Average price
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Independent variables
Total Number of Hospital Beds (100 s) −0.662 0.029*** −0.017 0.029***
(-0.54) (4.15) (-1.46) (4.21)
Medical Lab Wage - 0.000 - 0.001
- (0.52) - (1.55)
Population Density (1,000 s per Square Mile) 0.202*** −0.002*** 0.210*** −0.002***
(4.32) (-5.71) (4.74) (4.21)
Area (1,000 s of Square Miles) −8.050*** 0.110*** −10.674*** 0.114***
(-5.24) (4.62) (-6.81) (4.82)
Lab Technician Licensing Laws - - 445.607*** -
- - (19.12) -
Demographic Controlsa YES YES YES YES
Year Trend YES YES YES YES
Region Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Year Trend × Region Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
No. of Observations 5097 5097 5097 5097
R-squared 0.195 0.036 0.245 -
Root MSE 582.33 9.014 564.691 8.960
First-stage F-statistics - - 68.30
Wooldridge Robust Score Test - - 1.648
aOther control variables include county-level measure of % of uninsured, % of > 65 years old, per capita income, % Non-white, and % of < high school. Statistical
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels are denoted with ***, **, and * respectively
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Conclusion
This study examines whether agglomerated hospital
services are important in generating spillover effects,
which reduces the cost of producing health care. Among
various channels through which agglomeration economies
might take place in the hospital service industry, we focus
specifically on intermediate input sharing. Higher demand
for intermediate inputs from concentrated hospital
services increases the tendency of specialized intermediate
medical labs to locate at these places. The increased
presence of medical laboratories then reduces the price of
intermediate medical services at concentrated locations
due to competition or specialization, or possibly both.
Our analysis shows that the size of the hospital service
industry has a strong impact on reducing the price of
intermediate medical inputs. Further, the reduced price
at concentrated locations is mainly caused by the large
presence of the intermediate medical laboratory industry.
This evidence provides another important piece in the
growing body of evidence as to the source, size and nature
of agglomeration economies.
The results also yield strong policy implications for
the health care sector. Cost savings in the provision of
medical care have become increasingly important in
light of the enormous growth in medical spending and
the subsequent strain that it has put on both family and
public budgets. When determining where to locate
practices and hospitals, or when deciding which existing
hospitals to expand, cost savings from input sharing, as
well as other agglomeration sources should certainly be
taken into consideration.
Endnotes
1http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/works
2Previous studies examining the impact of health care
capacity find inconsistent evidence. Studies using available
cross-sectional datasets show almost complete absence of
a positive relationship between medical investment and
the quality of care ([11, 12]; [13]; [14]). In contrast, studies
based on instrumental variables, panel data, or other
differencing strategies suggest that higher medical invest-
ment is associated with significantly lower mortality
([15]; [16]; [17]; [18]; [19]; [20]).
3Numerous studies have provided evidence that external
economies of scale enhance productivity in the manufac-
turing sector, such as Nakamura [21], Henderson [22];
Ellison and Glaeser [23], Duranton and Puga [24],
Ellison et al. [25], Behrens and Bougna [26], etc. A
few studies have focused on the service sector [27, 28].
Bates and Santerre [1], Baicker and Chandra [29],
Cohen and Paul [2], and Li [4] are among the few
that examine productivity gains from agglomeration
in the health care industry.
4Agglomeration economies were first recognized by
Marshall [30] in his classic textbook. This concept
has been surveyed extensively in the later literature
[31-35].
5For instance, Glaeser and Maré [36] showed that a sig-
nificant fraction of the urban wage premium accrues to
workers by the spread of knowledge and stays with them
even when they leave cities; and Costa and Kahn [37]
documented that big cities are effective in solving the
colocation problem for dual career households by provid-
ing a large labor market pool. Other work on knowledge
spillovers and labor market pooling include Rosenthal and
Strange [38], Moretti [39], Ellison, et al. [25], etc.
6One feature of hospital agglomeration is that hospi-
tals not only gain benefits in the form of reduced costs,
but also in the form of improved quality. For example,
Baicker and Chandra [29] show that hospitals located
near other hospitals which provide high quality care in a
short time horizon begin to provide higher quality care
themselves. By focusing on a set of standard intermedi-
ate medical laboratory tests, we implicitly assume that
the quality of the tests is homogenous and that any im-
proved productivity is hence reflected in cost reductions.
7Lower input prices at concentrated places may arise
from two different sources as laid out in detail in the
supplementary materials. The first is that larger markets
in big cities allow input suppliers to compete with each
other, which drives down the price of intermediate in-
puts. This type of externality is referred to as pecuniary
agglomeration economies by Brueckner [5] since it is the
competition among suppliers, instead of better technol-
ogy, that leads to a reduction in the cost of a hospital’s
inputs. The second source relies on the existence of
scale economies in input production. If the input pro-
duction incurs increasing returns to scale, then large
outsourcing demand in hospital concentrated areas
allow specialized input producers to provide the service
at a lower cost by achieving an efficient scale of produc-
tion. In this sense, it is the specialization in producing
medical inputs that drives down the input prices. These
two different sources are modeled separately, but yield
similar predictions on the relationship between agglom-
eration extent and intermediate input prices.
8The model has been simplified to highlight the chan-
nels through which agglomeration economies reduce the
price of intermediate medical services. To keep this
focus, we did not incorporate many other aspects of the
medical industry that may also affect medical input costs
at the same time. This includes, for instance, the
potential bargaining taken place between hospitals and
insurance companies as captured by the relative size of
hospitals to local insurers.
9This is less likely to be true for some other services, such
as CAT scan reading, where scanned images can be easily
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transmitted for interpretation. This is also less likely to be
true for biopsies testing for rare diseases, or for genetic
tests, both of which are usually sent to one of a few national
expert labs. We do not consider such services in this study.
10FAIR Health, Inc. is an independent, New York non-
profit corporation. A thorough description of the FAIR
Health database can be found in Nicholson [40].
11When a provider submits a claim, each procedure billed
is denoted by a CPT code. In addition to the CPT code,
many providers will add on modifier codes to denote spe-
cific circumstances under which the procedure was done.
12This doesn’t mean that the procedures studied in
this paper are necessarily those most commonly out-
sourced. The absence of modifier code 90 could mean
either that the procedure was done in house, or, that the
provider does not use modifiers to denote outsourced
procedures. Not all providers use modifiers uniformly,
and while one provider may code modifiers for outsour-
cing, another may not. As such it is possible that proce-
dures other than those we identify are the most
commonly outsourced procedures.
13The procedure with the most frequent occurrence of
modifier code 90 was a venipuncture or drawing of
blood. In this case modifier code 90 denotes that the
blood sample was sent to an outside lab, not that the
action of drawing blood itself was outsourced. The next
100 procedures with the most frequent occurrence of
modifier 90 were all laboratory tests.
14Details can be found at http://www.cms.gov.
15This “Chinitz” effect has been explored in Jacobs
[41], Piore and Sabel [42], Saxenian [43], Rosenthal and
Strange [44], and Glaeser et al. [45].
16OLS and first stage regression results are consistent
with those found for the other two tests and are available
upon request.
17Even though we do not find an impact of indus-
trial density on the wage in the intermediate industry,
there is evidence that wages in the agglomerated
industry are impacted by the agglomeration. See for
example Freedman [46], Matano and Naticchioni [47]
and Figueirdo et al. [48].
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